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Abstract 
 
We use a structural VAR model with short-term restrictions to investigate the relative 
importance of interest rate, exchange rate and credit channels in the monetary policy 
transmission (MPT) for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland over 1993:1-2004:3. Main 
results are as follows. First, in the three countries, following a positive shock on the interest 
rate, prices increase instead of decreasing, due to the immediate depreciation of the nominal 
exchange rate. The results thus exhibit an "exchange rate" puzzle conducing to the appearance 
of a "price-puzzle". Second, none channel is very powerful for the MPT in the three countries. 
Nevertheless, the exchange rate and the interest rate channels play a growing role over the 
recent period in Poland, compared with the same channels in the Czech Republic and 
Hungary. As nominal exchange rate fluctuations allow for greater real shocks dampening in 
Poland, the cost of entering EMU may be more costly for this country than for the Czech 
Republic or Hungary.  
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1. Introduction and motivations 
 
A growing empirical literature has been devoted recently to monetary policy transmission 
(MPT) mechanisms in Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs). Most studies are 
motivated by the future adhesion of eight (and then ten) of them to the European Monetary 
Union (EMU)1. Indeed, eight of CEECs are new members of European Union (EU) since 
May 2004 (i.e. the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, 
and Slovenia). In 2007, Bulgaria and Romania are also due to join. Membership in EU 
necessitates respecting all the European laws and rules – the acquis communautaire – 
including the single currency project. Hence, sooner or later, new members of EU will have to 
join EMU2.  
In this context, a good knowledge on MPT mechanisms is particularly important. On the 
one hand, differences on MPT mechanisms between ‘old’ EMU members and new ones may 
hamper the monetary policy decisions-making of the European central bank (ECB) and may 
trigger an over-restrictive monetary stance within a few years. On the other hand, differences 
on MPT mechanisms between EMU members and forthcoming ones may also impede the 
present real convergence process of new EU members over the EMU ones. Thus, this may 
have destabilizing consequences on the whole EU project: countries desperately lagging 
behind may find little incentives to cooperate with the ‘old’ EU countries on topics like better 
law enforcement, enhanced tax harmonization, etc.  
The theoretical and empirical literature considers traditionally three channels for MPT 
mechanisms: the interest rate, the exchange rate, and the credit channels. While these 
channels are usually treated separately, the response of ultimate variables (e.g. output and its 
components, inflation, etc.) to a monetary policy shock will depend on combined effects of 
these three channels. Especially, it will depend on whether the exchange rate and credit 
channels accentuate or dampen the response of the economy to changes in interest rates3. 
According to the traditional Keynesian view, an increase in the nominal interest rate, by 
raising the real cost of borrowing, reduces investment and consumption. Then, following the 
demand fall, price begins to decrease (direct interest rate channel). If the increase in the 
nominal interest rate induces a real exchange rate appreciation (due to a nominal exchange 
rate appreciation), then net exports decrease, accentuating further the price decline (exchange 
rate channel). Finally, the credit channel operates through the effect of monetary policy on 
the supply of loans by depository institutions (bank lending channel) and through the net 
worth and the financial position of potential borrowers (balance sheet channel).  
The current empirical consensus is that the exchange rate is by far the main channel of 
MPT mechanisms in the CEECs while the interest rate channel dominates in actual EMU 
members4. Moreover, the impact of a policy interest rate shock on ultimate variables would be 
faster and stronger in actual EMU members than in CEECs. In fact, the transmission of the 
policy interest rate to lending and deposit rates would be blocked in CEECs due to their (still) 
                                                 
1 There is another motivation than future EMU membership: once main structural reforms are completed in 
these transition economies, a better knowledge on MPT per se will be crucial in order to implement an optimal 
monetary stance. 
2 Among the CEECs’ new EU members, Estonia, Lithuania and Slovenia intend to join EMU as early as in 
January 2007 while the Czech Republic would be the last one to adopt euro, by 2009-2010. For that purpose, 
they will have to fulfil the Maastricht criteria, as laid down in the Treaty. 
3 For theoretical developments, see for instance Bernanke and Blinder (1993) and Kierzenkowski (2004). 
4 For a survey on MPT mechanisms in CEECs, see for instance Ganev et al. (2002). For studies focusing on 
EMU members, see for instance Angeloni et al. (2003). 
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underdeveloped financial sectors (including the banking one). Nevertheless, some recent 
studies detect a growing role for both the interest rate and credit channels over the recent 
years or, at least, conclude in that sense (see, for instance, Gunduz, 2004; Kuijs, 2002). 
Our empirical work aims at updating the evidence on MPT mechanisms using the recent 
available data for the three large new EU members: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. 
For that purpose, we use a structural VAR, now a standard methodology to analyse MPT 
mechanisms, and allowing for a direct comparison of results with some previous studies. 
Before that, we present some key features on financial sectors in the CEECs, including a 
comparison with EMU countries. 
 
2. Financial sectors and monetary policy frameworks: how do they stand in the 
CEECs?  
 
2.1. Financial markets in CEECs: an overview 
Following most economists, “the MPT will vary systematically across countries with 
differences in the size, concentration and health of the banking systems, and with differences 
in the availability of primary capital market financing” (Cecchetti, 1999; parts of the 
quotation underlined by the authors)5.  
The size of financial sectors (including the banking one) indicates to what extent they 
contribute to the financing of economic activities. Clearly, the more developed financial 
sectors, the more agents can rely upon it for consumption and investment matters. In this 
context, the extent to which agents are dependent on bank financing is an important factor 
determining the strength and effectiveness of the bank lending channel. Moreover, for this 
channel to work, a monetary policy tightening must effectively limit banks' ability to supply 
loans, by reducing bank reserves. If banks can adjust their balance sheets with an alternative 
source of investment funds (by selling securities or issuing instruments which are not subject 
to reserve requirement, e.g. bonds or certificates of deposits), they can absorb the monetary 
policy tightening without reducing the supply of loans. In this respect, a (structural) excess of 
liquidity for the banking sector is expected to reduce the effectiveness of policy interest rate 
increases.  
The banking sector in the CEECs remains largely under-sized compared to the euro area, 
even if fast developments have been observed in most CEECs over the last years (Table 1)6. 
For instance, the bank credit to private sector lies between 15% of GDP in Lithuania and 40% 
in Slovakia and Slovenia, against more than 110% in the euro area. A particular fast growth in 
bank credit to private sector has been observed in Hungary and Latvia since the late of 1990s. 
Only the Czech Republic and Slovakia show a decrease in their credit-to-private sector GDP 
ratio, as a result of the clean up and restructuring of their banking sector.  
The underdevelopment of banking sectors in CEECs is not compensated by strong non-
bank financial sectors. The stock market capitalisation lies between 3.6% of GDP in Lithuania 
and 37.5% in Estonia, against more than 100% in the euro area. Hungary, Poland, and to a 
lesser extent, the Czech Republic have even recorded a decrease in their stock market 
capitalisation, mostly as a result of de-listed companies. Debt securities markets are neither 
very developed markets in CEECs. Especially, they are largely dominated by government 
                                                 
5 The reader will find more details in Bonin and Wachtel (2002), ECB (2002). 
6 They appear undersized also in comparison with the overall degree of development of CEECS, as proxied 
by GDP per capita (Cottarelli et al., 2003). 
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papers. In the Czech Republic and Slovenia where monetary financial institutions account for 
respectively 60 and 40% of total debt securities, it is worth noting that more than 90 % 
represent short-term instruments issued by the central bank and used for the purposes of 
monetary policy operations (ECB, 2003). Finally, the presence of private sectors (including 
also the banking institutions) as issuers on debt markets is very limited7. 
Thus, as evidenced from Table 1, financial systems in the CEECs are more bank-based 
than they are market-based. While a same conclusion can be drawn from the situation in the 
euro area (or in the EU-15), the banking dependence of economic agents is by far much 
greater in the CEECs. Then, with a lack of liquidity for the banking sectors, the bank lending 
channel is expected to be powerful for MPT, up to (perhaps) oversize the interest rate or the 
exchange rate channels.  
Consider now in more details the development of banking sectors in CEECs over the 
most recent years. First, the credit growth to private sector was driven to a large extent by 
credit to households, which showed very low credit levels compared to enterprises in the late 
1990s (Table A, Appendix 1). Then, opening the credit market to households in recent years 
could therefore increase the MPT mechanism based on the bank lending channel. But so long 
as the bank lending channel will mainly operate via firms and, in the case of Poland, strong 
improvements on labour markets (leading to a lower rate of unemployment and higher 
effective demand) will not have occurred, this channel will surely prove relatively low.  
Second, bank financing of the credit growth to the private sector mainly operated through 
domestic savings flows (Table B, Appendix 1). Indeed, with the exception of Latvia and 
Estonia where international borrowing was sizeable, the growth of credit-to-GDP ratio was 
broadly in line with the growth of deposits-to-GDP. Other exception was Hungary where the 
strong increase of other net liabilities was due to large declines in reserve requirements 
between 1999 and 2001 that decreased net assets held at the central bank by the banking 
sector and then freed funds for credit activities. In most CEECs, the decline (or small 
increase) of bank credit to the public sector contributed also to the credit growth to private 
sector. This "crowding-in" effect can be illustrated by the fact that the general-government-
deficit-to-GDP ratio in countries with high credit growth was half that of countries with low 
credit growth (Cotarrelli et al., 2003). In the Czech Republic and Slovakia where the private 
credit-to-GDP ratio decreases, the (large) drop in other net liabilities reflects the increase in 
assets held at the central bank, due to large sterilization operations (following large capital 
inflows). International borrowing contributed to a non negligible extent to the growth in bank 
credit to public sector in these two countries. Then, the credit channel is not only expected to 
work differently across countries but also in a non-straightforward manner. While the 
"crowding-in" effect reinforces the credit channel, international borrowing to finance 
domestic credit allows circumventing operations of the central bank which are aimed at 
absorbing the excess in liquidity. In turn, modifications in the reserve requirements alter the 
availability of funds and then the credit channel. 
Alongside these general factors, concentration and health of banking systems are viewed 
as relevant factors for assessing the strength of the credit channel. Cechetti (1999) argues that 
larger and healthier banks will be able to adjust to the policy-induced reserve changes more 
easily than smaller and less healthy banks. Hence, countries with less concentrated and less 
healthy banking systems are expected to be more sensitive to monetary policy actions of the 
central bank. However, health of banking sectors deserves special mention in CEECS where 
                                                 
7 Non-banking financial institutions (e.g. insurance companies, leasing companies) are known as not very 
sized in the CEECs (except in Estonia for leasing). Nevertheless, due to unavailability of synthetic data, we do 
not report figures on that point. 
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the non-performing loans caused financial crises in the 1990s. A monetary stimulus is 
expected to be rather ineffective if the banking system is over-burdened by non-performing 
loans. For instance, according to Wagner and Iakova (2001), declines in the policy rates in 
Slovakia and in the Czech Republic in 1998-2000 did not translate into credit growth for this 
reason. As banks struggled to meet the stricter provisioning requirements, credit to the private 
sector continued to decline. More generally, another important indicator of health of banking 
systems is the capital adequacy ratio (i.e. the Basle capital rules).  
As evident from Table 1, banking systems in CEECs are characterised by a high degree of 
concentration. The five largest banks account for around 50% of assets in Poland and 
Hungary, and up to 100% in Estonia, with an average of 68% which quite largely contrasts 
with the euro area average of 52%. Similar figures emerge for concentration of deposits and 
credit in CEECs. Turning to health indicators, the non-performing loans have been sharply 
reduced in most CEECs over the last years. Slovakia still exhibits poor performance with a 
24.3% share of non-performing loans in total banks while Estonia shows the best performance 
with a corresponding share of 1.5 %. The Basle capital adequacy ratio is largely met, since to 
comply with this ratio, a risk-weighted equity ratio of at least 8% must be maintained. In 2001, 
this ratio lied between 11.9% in Slovenia and 19.6% in Slovakia. This relatively good 
performance should improve the credit channel. 
It is worth noting that both development and improved health in banking sectors are due to 
privatisations, especially to the sales of previous stated-owned banks to foreign investors, 
almost originating from EU-15. Foreign owners account for 55% of total banking assets in 
Slovenia and up to 97.5% in Estonia. As a result, by importing banking expertise from the 
"old" EU, the efficiency of banks has increased considerably in the past few years. For 
instance, in September 2003, only Slovenia, Lithuania and the Czech Republic had spreads 
between lending and deposit rates that remained greater than those in the euro area. 
Consequently, the banks in CEECs provided agents with financial intermediation services on 
favourable terms and conditions, comparable to the ones of the euro area. 
 
2.2. Monetary policy frameworks in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland: some 
implications for the MPT 
During the period 1993-2003, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland have been 
characterised by a double shift in their monetary policy framework. One the one hand, they 
moved from fixed to more flexible exchange rate regimes and, on the other hand, from money 
supply to inflation targets. Of course, these two shifts were not independent of each other. In 
the beginning of the transition period, a fixed-exchange-rate regime had been adopted in most 
post-socialist countries as a nominal anchor for stabilisation purposes. Indeed, two-digit – or 
even three-digit – inflation rates were the rule. Though the shifts in exchange rate regimes and 
targets might be related to country-specific factors, capital inflows with a fixed exchange rate 
– leading to a real exchange rate appreciation, which in turn resulted in a significant loss of 
competitiveness and a worsening of the current account – might be the common story to 
explain the subsequent shift to a more flexible exchange rate regime over the most recent 
years (see Halpern and Wyplosz, 1997). 
The exchange rate policies followed by the countries might have affected the channels of 
MPT. Indeed, under a quasi-fixed exchange rate regime, growing capital inflows induced 
sterilisation operations by the central banks in an attempt to absorb the excess of banking 
sector liquidity. Then, neither the exchange rate channel (by definition) nor the credit channel 
might have been significantly at work. Indeed, in case of excess in liquidity, banks abounding 
with funds can conduct their own interest rate policy, independently of the interest rate policy 
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followed by the central bank, and especially can sustain low interest rates on credit to gain in 
market shares. Thus, a shift towards a more flexible exchange rate regime might have allowed 
the exchange rate channel to increase its importance as a MPT mechanism, but also the credit 
channel by reducing the banking sector’s excess in liquidity. Finally, the structural over-
liquidity prevented the central banks of countries under study from adopting the same set of 
monetary policy instruments than their West counterparts and then ECB, at least up to the end 
of 1990s. Since then, the harmonization in instruments has been undergone, but essentially 
under the impetus of future membership in the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) 
which is effective since May 20048. Indeed, an excess in liquidity constitutes always a salient 
feature of their banking sectors. Nevertheless, whether the credit channel exists or not in 
CEECs remains an econometrical matter due to the various (and opposite) forces at work, as 
described above. This is one of the issues treated in the next section. 
 
3. A VAR model for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland 
 
As already mentioned, our primary focus on the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland is 
motivated by their early movement towards (official) exchange rate regimes with some degree 
of flexibility 9 . Such arrangements enable their central banks to follow a relatively 
“unconstrained” monetary policy. Studying the reactions of key variables to their monetary 
policies then sheds light on the relative importance of MPT channels. Moreover, it gives some 
insight on the effectiveness of the nominal exchange rate in absorbing shocks, and then on the 
costs to give up the national currency for the euro.  
For that purpose, a structural VAR is adopted. As Christiano et al. (1999) put it, using a 
VAR approach permits to focus almost exclusively on the effects of a peculiar shock per se, 
here a monetary shock, and thus, to distinguish in the actions of the monetary policy makers 
which part is a response to monetary developments in the economy and which part is not. 
Good knowledge on the effects of a monetary policy shock is of high relevance in the context 
of monetary integration.  
 
                                                 
8 By joining EU, the central bank of a newcomer becomes ipso facto a member of the ESCB, but without 
participating in the monetary policy decisions of the euro area. The central bank must then adjust the principles 
of its operations to standards and requirements worked out within the ESCB, in view of future EMU membership. 
9 Presently, the exchange rate regimes of countries are classified as follows by the International Monetary 
Fund: “managed floating” for the Czech Republic; “large bands” of +/-15 % for Hungary; “purely floating” for 
Poland.  
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Table 1 : Basic statistics on CEECs financial sectors 
Credit to the 
private sector  
(in % of GDP) 
Stock market capitalization 
(in % of GDP) 
Debt securities 
outstanding  
(in % of GDP) 
 
Of which, by type of issuers 
(in % of total debt securities outstanding)  
 
1999 2003 1999* End 2002 
(2000 : euro area) 
End 2002** General government MFI*** Non-MFI 
New EU members 
CEECs  
Czech republic 
Estonia 
Hungary 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Poland 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
 
 
31.7 
61.0 
24.3 
26.1 
14.5 
12.8 
26.5 
54.6 
33.9 
 
33.6 
34.0 
33.2 
43.0 
34.6 
20.6 
29.1 
32.6 
41.7 
 
 
22.2 
34.2 
33.7 
6.2 
.. 
19.1 
3.7 
10.9 
 
 
17.5 
20.3 
37.3 
20.3 
8.2 
10.1 
13.8 
3.6 
26.3 
 
 
 
57.0 
3.0 
55.0 
12.0 
16.0 
33.0 
34.0 
47.0 
 
 
 
34.0 
50.0 
83.0 
90.0 
96.0 
82.0 
98.0 
59.0 
 
 
 
60.0 
32.0 
15.0 
10.0 
0.0 
7.0 
0.4 
40.0 
 
 
6.0 
18.0 
2.0 
0.0 
4.0 
11.0 
1.6 
1.0 
Euro area 101.3 112.43 .. 106.2 124.8 .. .. .. 
 Sources : IMF, own computations; *Bonin and Wachtel (2002); **ECB (2003) 
 Note: *** MFI (Monetary financial institutions). 
 
Table 1 (continued): Basic statistics on CEECs financial sectors 
Share of the five 
largest banks  
(in terms of assets) 
Non performing loans 
(in % of total bank loans* 
 
Capital adequacy 
(equity capital as a % of 
risk-weighted bank assets) 
Foreign owners 
(in % of total banking 
assets) 
Difference between 
lending and deposit rates 
(in % point) 
 
1998 End 
2000* 
1999** 2003 2001*** 1999* 2002* 1999 2003 
(september) 
New EU members 
CEECs  
Czech republic 
Estonia 
Hungary 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Poland 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
 
 
 
66.2 
 
50.8 
 
 
42.9 
 
64 
 
 
 
66.1 
98.8 
53.3 
62.3 
88.5 
48.6 
63.4 
62.5 
 
 
 
21.5 
2.9 
4.4 
6.8 
11.9 
14.5 
32.9 
8.6 
 
 
13.7 
1.5 
3.1 
3.1 
7.4 
20.1 
24.3 
9.2 
 
 
 
15.4 
14.4 
15.6 
14.2 
15.5 
15.0 
19.6 
11.9 
 
 
28.1 
90.0 
61.8 
78.2 
38.2 
47.2 
28.2 
47.5 
 
 
 
90.1 
97.5 
65.5 
62.6 
83.9 
68.4 
81.0 
55.0 
 
 
4.2 
6.9 
4.4 
9.2 
8.1 
5.7 
6.7 
5.1 
 
 
 
3.8 
2.3 
2.0 
2.2 
4.2 
3.5 
2.9 
4.8 
 
Euro area 50.0 52.0 .. 2.71 .. .. .. 3.2 3.5 
 Sources : IMF, own computations; *Gros (2003); ** Bonin and Wachtel (2002); ***Deutsche Bundesbank (2003).  
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3.1. The VAR specification 
The general framework for the VAR representation can be summarized by: 
(1) 1( ) ( )t t t tY A L Y B L X ε−= + + , 
where tY  is the vector of endogenous variables for each new EU member, and tX  is the 
vector of exogenous foreign (e.g. European) variables. The vector of exogenous variables 
contains a policy nominal interest rate (denoted euroti ), an industrial production index (denoted 
euro
ty ) and a consumer prices index (denoted 
euro
tp ), the two latter including the "old" EU 
countries, whereas the former stands only for the euro area10: 
(2) ' euro euro eurot t t tX i y p⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦  
These variables control for the growing real and financial integration of the new EU 
members with the "old" EU ones; put differently, they control for the economic underlying 
changes in their main economic partner – the "old" EU. By treating these variables as 
exogenous, we implicitly assume that there is no feedback from the new EU members to the 
"old" EU. We also allow for a contemporaneous impact of the exogenous variables on the 
endogenous new EU member variables. 
In the first (baseline) model, the vector of endogenous variables for each new EU 
member, tY , consists of an industrial production index ( ty ), a consumer prices index ( tp ), a 
policy nominal interest rate ( ti ) and a nominal effective exchange rate ( te ): 
(3) 't t t t tY y p i e⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦  
Our focus on the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER), rather than on the real one, 
has a twofold justification. First, the exchange rate channel is thus more easily distinguishable 
from the other channels. Second, concluding on the possible cost of entering EMU for the 
new EU members is facilitated, since fluctuations in the exchange rate against the euro 
account for a substantial part of fluctuations in the NEER due to strong trade links with the 
EU-15.  
In the second (variant) model, we include either a monetary aggregate ( tm ) or a 
domestic credit aggregate ( tdc ) in the bloc of endogenous variables. Indeed, money 
developments have played an important role in the monetary policy strategies of the new EU 
members’ states, especially from the beginning of the transition period until the shift to 
inflation targeting at the end of the 1990s11. The inclusion of a monetary aggregate could 
therefore be helpful in strictly identifying monetary policy shocks per se, i.e. distinguishing 
them from money demand shocks. As for the credit aggregate, its inclusion makes the credit 
channel explicit in the monetary transmission mechanism. In these two variants of the second 
model, the vector of endogenous variables can be written respectively as: 
 (4) 't t t t t tY y p i e m⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦  
 (5) 't t t t t tY y p i e dc⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦  
                                                 
10 See Appendix 2 for a precise definition of data. Each of the VAR models also contains a constant and a 
linear trend. 
11 For a more comprehensive description of monetary policy strategy in the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland, see for instance Creel and Levasseur (2004). 
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In both models, structural shocks are recursively identified, through the standard 
Choleski-decomposition with the variables ordered as in (3), (4) and (5)12. The underlying 
assumptions are then that, in the short-run, shocks on interest rate, exchange rate and money 
or credit (when the latter are included) have no contemporaneous impact on industrial 
production and prices due to the sluggish reaction of the real sector (y and p) to shocks in the 
monetary and financial sectors (i, e, m or dc). The interest rate responds contemporaneously to 
shocks on industrial production and prices, a situation which can be interpreted as a reaction 
function of monetary authorities to shocks affecting the real sector. The nominal exchange 
rate is immediately affected by all types of shocks, except shocks on monetary aggregate or 
domestic credit aggregate (when they are included in the VAR).  
Shocks on y can be interpreted as real demand shocks (taste shocks, fiscal policy shocks); 
shocks on p as supply shocks (productivity shocks); shocks on i as monetary policy shocks, 
and shocks on e as financial shocks (sunspots, portfolio shocks). Shocks on m and c can be 
interpreted as money demand shocks (innovations in banking and financial sectors along the 
transition process). 
Each VAR model is estimated in levels using monthly data over the period 1993:1-
2004:3. The only exception is Hungary when credit or money is included in the VAR. In this 
case, due to availability of data, estimations are running over 1999:12-2004:3. As usual, the 
first years of transition from planned to market economy characterised by turbulent 
fluctuations in economic variables have been dropped.  
The choice of a VAR in level rather than in first difference can be justified by the fact 
that some variables tend to be I(2) and that we detected some cointegration relationships 
between variables in level13.  
The choice of monthly data has been motivated by the search for accurate estimates but it 
has self-imposed the use of industrial production data rather than GDP data. All data are 
seasonally adjusted and expressed in logs, except the interest rates which are kept in percent 
points. The Schwarz criterion has been used to determine the lag-order of the VARs, which 
turned out to be of order one14.  
 
                                                 
12 With the five-variable VARs, the ordering of endogenous variables follows Gunduz (2003) to get a direct 
comparison with his findings.  
13 Vostroknutova (2003) concludes that during the transition period, many variables that are normally I(1) 
come closer to I(2) processes for considerable periods of time. More precisely, based on monthly data from 
1991:5 to 1999:12 for Poland, the unit root hypothesis cannot be rejected for the first differences of consumer 
prices index, nominal exchange rate, nominal money stock, nominal wage rate and, marginally, for industrial 
price index. By contrast, indications of I(2) processes are obviously present in the data. Our data set also presents 
indications of I(2) process (e.g. the prices index, the credit aggregate). Moreover, we have detected cointegration 
relationships both with the Johansen procedure and with a two-step procedure. Nevertheless, too short time 
series impede to make explicit cointegration estimations. Thus, we have decided to estimate the VAR in levels 
rather than in differences as in EFN (2004), Gunduz (2003) or Peersman and Smets (2003) for instance. 
14 Robustness checks with higher lags have been performed and do not change qualitative results. 
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3.2. Estimation results 
 
3.2.1. The baseline VAR  
The impulse response functions (IRFs) of the VAR models with four endogenous 
variables for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are shown in, respectively, Figures 1, 
1/Bis, 1/Ter. For instance, the 4th column of Figure 1 gives the effects of a two-standard-
deviation nominal exchange rate shock (or innovation) on industrial production, consumer 
prices, the interest rate and exchange rate for the Czech Republic, together with a 90 percent 
confidence band. The 3rd column gives the responses of the same variables to a shock on 
policy interest rate while the 1st and 2nd columns disclose the impacts of shocks respectively 
on industrial production and consumer prices. 
Focusing on the real demand, supply and financial shocks, it appears that responses are 
different from one group of countries (the Czech Republic and Poland) to the other country 
(Hungary). Within the first group, a positive real demand shock produces a significant rise in 
the nominal interest rate (and in the nominal exchange rate in the Czech case) while a 
negative supply shock only reduces industrial production. In contrast, both shocks have no 
significant impact in Hungary. It may be astonishing unless the underlying model is badly 
fitted for the Hungarian situation whereas it is better fitted for the other two countries. As far 
as the financial shock is concerned, it appears that an unexpected nominal exchange rate 
appreciation reduces prices and the nominal interest rate in the Czech Republic and Poland; in 
the first country, a significant and persistent rise in industrial production at a 1-year horizon is 
also noticeable. This is presumably the consequence of the long-lasting reduction in the 
nominal interest rate, coupled with the long-lasting decrease in the price level: these better 
conditions would presumably help to “stabilize the stabilization efforts” of the Czech 
authorities. In Hungary, the same financial shock significantly and immediately reduces 
industrial production; price and interest rate responses are not significant.  
Regarding the IRFs of a monetary policy shock in the three countries, differences among 
them almost disappear. Following an increase in the policy interest rate, prices tend to 
increase and IRFs thus exhibit the appearance of a "price-puzzle". This result contrasts with 
some studies on MPT mechanisms applied either to the euro area or to the CEECs (for 
instance, Peersman and Smets (2003) and EFN (2004) for the euro area; Gunduz (2003) for 
the Czech Republic; Creel and Levasseur (2004) for the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland). Exceptions are Ganev et al. (2002) in the Czech case; Anzuini and Levy (2004) for 
the Czech Republic and Poland (but the “price puzzle” is not robust to the adoption of a 
shorter sample period); Hericourt and Matei (2004) in the Czech case, and Jarocinski (2004) 
for a group of CEECs countries.  
According to Sims (1992), the price puzzle arises due to an error in identifying the 
exogenous part of monetary policy. Without an indicator for future inflation within the 
endogenous variables of the VAR, the price rise following a positive shock on the nominal 
interest rate would appear as a normal response to higher expected inflation: what has been 
labelled an “exogenous monetary shock” in fact contains some portion of the endogenous 
response of the monetary authorities to higher future (or expected) inflation. In order to 
circumvent the “puzzle”, it has therefore been advised to incorporate commodity prices as 
endogenous variables in the VARs; so doing, the truly exogenous component of monetary 
policy would be more accurately identified.  
Two recent contributions to the large literature on the “price puzzle” have recently 
doubted the favourable incidence of introducing commodity prices in the VARs. Giordani 
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(2004) shows that the puzzle can be solved if the SVAR model comprehensively mimics the 
underlying macroeconomic theoretical model: introducing simultaneously the output and the 
output gap, hence a strict IS curve and a Phillips curve, makes the puzzle disappear. 
Introducing also a commodity price index does not help. Hanson (2004) finds that the 
assumed correlation between the commodity price index and future inflation is not 
straightforward. More generally, he finds “little correlation between an ability to forecast 
inflation and an ability to resolve the price puzzle”. Performing VARs with US data on a sub-
sample over which the “price puzzle” is clearly identified, Hanson (2004) cannot resolve the 
puzzle with whatever indicator used to forecast inflation.  
In relation to these two recent contributions, first, it has to be acknowledged that output 
gap data for the CEECs are unavailable either on a long time span or on a monthly basis. It 
does not permit to test the Giordani’s hypothesis. Second, as far as exchange rates (or 
commodity prices) are concerned, our results do in fact solve the price puzzle: following the 
increase in the policy interest rate innovation, the nominal exchange rate depreciates 
immediately in the three countries and IP growth temporarily resumes in the Czech and Polish 
cases15. The puzzle with the consequence of a positive innovation on the nominal interest rate 
has thus more to do with the exchange rate than the price level per se. These depreciations 
and, in some cases, the boost on aggregate demand are at the core of the price increases. This 
is confirmed by the impact on prices of a nominal exchange rate innovation in the Czech 
Republic and Poland.  
Finally, a few words on the evolution of industrial production (IP) after the various 
shocks may be somewhat enlightening of the long-run efforts these CEECs will have to 
accomplish in order to perform real convergence towards the EU-countries. In Hungary and 
Poland, it is peculiarly impressive to see how low and temporary IP responses are to the 
various shocks. Only in the Czech Republic do innovations on the price index and the interest 
rate have a non-zero impact on IP. Hence, a monetary policy shock has at best a very thin 
impact on industrial production in these three countries. Moreover, it has to be acknowledged 
that either inertia in the IP dynamics is very large in these countries or that factors not taken 
into account here (institutions, asymmetric information, monetary aggregates) do play a 
crucial role in the evolution of industrial production.  
 
3.2.2. The variant VARs 
Figures 2 and 3 give the results of the VAR models in which we have added respectively 
money and credit. The 5th column of each figure gives the responses of endogenous variables 
ordered as in (4) or (5) to an innovation in monetary or credit aggregates. 
The five-variable VARs give almost similar results as the baseline VARs, so that it shall 
be concluded that monetary aggregates were not the missing variable of the baseline case to 
which the low reaction of industrial production to innovations could have been attributed.  
Outcomes with the two variants of the baseline VAR still give small responses of 
consumer prices and industrial output to shocks on interest rate and exchange rate, on the one 
hand, and apparent “price puzzles”, on the other hand, except in Hungary.  
In this country, incorporating either credit or money as an endogenous variable in the 
VAR makes the price rise insignificant and thus solves (more or less) the “price puzzle”. 
Respective responses of credit and money to a monetary policy shock in Hungary are rather 
                                                 
15 Similar dynamics can be found in Ganev et al. (2002) and Jarocinski (2004), though with different 
specifications and models. 
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counter-intuitive: following a positive innovation in the nominal interest rate, credit and 
money increase immediately. In fact, the innovation also generates a large and significant 
nominal exchange rate depreciation that surely boosts aggregate demand (insignificant) as 
well as demand for credit or money.  
In Hungary and Poland, increases in credit aggregates following a monetary tightening 
are usually explained by the permanent excess in banking sector liquidity over the last decade 
(Kierzenkowski, 2004; OECD, 2002). This excess in liquidity (defined as the net 
indebtedness of the central bank towards commercial banks) has been the result of strong 
capital inflows in the context of relatively fixed exchange rate policies until the late 1990s, 
leading to large sterilization operations by central banks. According to Kierzenkowski (2004), 
the consequence of excess liquidity for the MPT mechanism is that banks became less 
reactive to policy measures. The policy rate (e.g. the rate of open market operations) plays the 
role of a marginal investment rate rather than that of determining the marginal cost of banks’ 
liabilities. In this context, as soon as there is additional demand for credit, banks can decide to 
increase their supply of credit even in a context of higher policy rate.  
Kierzenkowski (2004) shows that for Poland, over 1996-1999, while the share of loans 
was equal to, or up to 1.4 times higher than the share of securities in banking assets, the 
percentage of interest earned on credits was almost 2.5 times higher in banking income than 
the percentage of interest yielded by securities. As a result, development in credit aggregates 
(and monetary aggregates) can also be totally disconnected from policy rates, and driven 
mainly by real considerations. Such seems to be the case in our variant models for Poland and 
the Czech Republic. As for the latter, although it is characterised by excess liquidity, as noted 
by Gunduz (2003), the banking clean-up at the late of 1990s may also possibly explain the 
absence of a significant response of credit to a monetary policy innovation in this country. 
Hence, the “disconnection argument” should not be overstated: a positive innovation on credit 
produces a significant reduction in industrial production, a significant price rise and, last but 
not least, a significant rise in the nominal interest rate which may dampen credit.  
To conclude, the small responses of industrial production and prices to both interest rate 
and exchange rate shocks suggest that these two channels are not very powerful as MPT 
mechanisms. Following a positive interest rate shock, market participants expect a 
depreciation in the nominal exchange rate for the future, which generates an immediate, even 
if small, nominal exchange rate depreciation due to an over-reaction of market participants16. 
Then, industrial production is temporarily boosted and the country imports temporarily some 
inflation from abroad. In other words, interest rate manipulations are not really efficient in 
altering both prices and industrial production developments. Similarly, exchange rate 
manipulations (e.g. an unexpected devaluation) are not very efficient in boosting strongly and 
durably industrial production. This appears more clearly when looking at variance 
decompositions.  
 
                                                 
16 Other possible explanations for an immediate depreciation of nominal exchange rate are (i) a mark-up 
behaviour by firms and (ii) the lack of confidence in monetary policy or, more generally, in economic policies. 
See below. 
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3.2.3. Variance decompositions 
Table 2 reports the variance decompositions at a twelve-month horizon for the models 
estimated without money or credit over the full sample (1993:1–2004:3) and a sub-sample 
(2000:1–2004:3)17.  
Over the full sample, the variance of NEER is mainly explained by financial shocks, 
ranging from around 75% in Hungary to 95% in Poland (e.g. shocks on e in table 2). The 
fluctuations of NEER due to real shocks are then very low, especially in Poland where real 
shocks explain less than 1% of NEER variance (e.g. shocks on y and p in table 2 accounting 
respectively for real demand shocks and supply shocks). In other words, the nominal 
exchange rate does not serve to a large extent as a shock absorber18. This finding is confirmed 
by the very low contribution of shocks on NEER to the variance of industrial production, 
ranging from around 0% for the Czech Republic to 4% in Hungary. Similarly, the 
contributions of monetary policy shock to the variance of industrial production are very low, 
ranging from around 0% for Hungary to less than 7% for the Czech Republic (e.g. shock on i 
in table 2). More generally, the variance of industrial production and consumer prices is 
mainly explained by real shocks. This is especially true for Hungary and Poland, and to a 
lesser extent in the Czech Republic. Indeed, the Czech Republic is the country in our sample 
where the interest rate channel (even if small) is the most substantial. Moreover, in the Czech 
Republic, the interest rate channel dominates the exchange rate channel, thus confirming the 
finding of Gunduz (2003), though with a different VAR model than ours. 
The variance decompositions over the sub-sample (2000:1–2004:3) confirm that the 
variance of NEER is mainly explained by financial shocks. But, quite interestingly, the 
contribution of real shocks to the variance of NEER is now substantial. This is particularly 
true for Poland where real demand and supply shocks together explain around 15% of the 
variance of NEER for the recent period, against less than 1% over the full sample. For 
Hungary and the Czech Republic, the total contribution of real shocks to the variance of 
NEER over the most recent period is superior to 10%. Then, the nominal exchange rate seems 
to play a growing role in absorbing real shocks, explaining up to 25% of the variance in 
industrial production in Poland and 16% in Hungary over the most recent period (against 
respectively 2% and 4% over the full sample). These results confirm the principal outcome of 
Creel and Levasseur (2004) that the renunciation to nominal exchange rate fluctuations would 
surely be more costly for Poland than for the Czech Republic and Hungary. Moreover, in 
Poland, alongside the exchange rate channel, the interest rate channel plays a growing role in 
the recent period19. 
 
                                                 
17 The variance decompositions with a VAR including a monetary aggregate (or credit aggregate) give very 
similar trends for the Czech and Polish cases. A comparison of the two samples for Hungary, including either 
money or credit, has proven impossible since money and credit data have only been available since 1999:12.  
18  Borghijs and Kuijs (2004) reach a similar conclusion with a VAR model consisting of industrial 
production and nominal exchange rate (both variables expressed relative to euro area and taken in first 
difference) with long run restrictions (only supply shocks have a long run impact on industrial production). 
19 Meanwhile, since the convergence of short-term interest rate on the euro area is still far from being 
achieved in Poland, the Polish economy will gain from lower short-term interest rate by entering EMU. It 
contrasts particularly with the Czech Republic where the convergence of short-term interest rates was already 
achieved 2 or 3 years ago. 
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3.3. Alternative identification schemes  
 
Our findings are robust to different specifications20. First, considering the real effective 
exchange rate rather than the nominal one does not alter results, suggesting that the evolution 
of real and nominal exchange rates are broadly in line. In fact, the real appreciation of 
exchange rate (due to catching-up process or the so-called “Balassa-Samuelson” effect) as 
well as the nominal appreciation one can observe from the data are controlled for by a linear 
trend in the estimations. 
Second, considering dummies representative of shifts in exchange rate regimes and/or 
monetary targets (as in Borhijs and Kuijs, 2004, or Creel and Levasseur, 2004) rather than 
exogenous European variables gives similar response functions of endogenous variables to 
shocks, but with larger confidence intervals21. In fact, the vector of exogenous European 
variables presents much more time-variability than the vector of dummies (e.g. shifts in 
official exchange rate regime are scarcer) and then results in more accurate estimates. 
Third, changing the ordering of monetary and financial variables (interest rate, exchange 
rate, money or credit) does not affect the results. This point was already noted by Gunduz 
(2003).  
Last, considering more than one lag does not help to solve the appearance of a "price-
puzzle", nor the “exchange-rate puzzle” of monetary-contraction-induced nominal exchange 
rate depreciation. The presence of an "exchange-rate puzzle" cannot be considered as an 
econometrical artefact. For instance, the Hungarian experience during June 2003 is 
particularly illustrative of how even strong increases in the interest rate can fail to induce an 
(immediate) appreciation in the exchange rate and then to import disinflation22. In fact, the 
increase in the nominal interest rate, in the case of relatively sticky prices, has important 
consequences on the market participants’ perception regarding the future public debt 
dynamics: a higher interest rate increases the probability of default on the debt and may make 
domestic public debt less attractive, leading to currency depreciation. Such an outcome is 
more likely the higher the level of public debt, the higher the proportion of foreign-currency-
denominated debt and the higher the price of risk. Within the transition (unstable) period, with 
a growing official public debt level in the three CEECs under study, and with the risk that 
implicit and off-budget-deficit induced debt may outperform official figures, the “exchange-
rate puzzle” can be expected to occur. 
Over-reaction of markets participants due to a lack of confidence in economic policies 
can induce an immediate depreciation in the exchange rate following a tightening in monetary 
policy. Interestingly, EFN (2004) observes that loosened fiscal policies were generally 
followed by tight monetary policies, especially in Hungary and Poland, then possibly 
breaking the standard MPT mechanisms. In a VAR controlling for fiscal deficit (in Hungary 
                                                 
20 All the results of robustness tests are available from the authors on request. 
21 To some extent, dummies and exogenous European variables are the two faces of a same coin. For 
instance, a fixed exchange rate regime (as the one chosen in the beginning of the transition period by the three 
countries under study) is only sustainable when foreign (European) and domestic developments are on line. But 
once nominal stabilization has been reached, a shift towards a more flexible exchange rate arrangement (as the 
ones chosen at the end of 1990’s by these countries) can be viewed as a mean to gain monetary policy autonomy. 
22 Between the 11 and 30 of June 2003, although the Hungarian central bank increased its key interest rate 
by 200-point basis (bringing the short-term interest rate differential against the euro to 750 basis points), the 
depreciation of the Forint against the euro was more than 3% (see Levasseur, 2004). This development 
intervened in a context of growing twin deficits that may have hampered the credibility of the Hungarian policy 
mix. 
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and Poland), EFN (2004) finds that the "price-puzzle" disappears in Hungary and Poland. 
Nevertheless, the “exchange-rate puzzle” remains with the different specifications we use.  
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
In contrast with most of previous VARs studies focusing on transition countries23, we 
introduce at least two important differences. First, to take into account growing real and 
financial integration of new EU members with the EU-15 over the last decade, we control all 
the VARs for exogenous European variables. Second, to investigate explicitly the credit 
channel versus other channels, we directly introduce a credit aggregate in some versions of 
the VARs. The former difference surely has more incidences on the outcomes than the latter. 
Introducing credit or money aggregates (only) produces the following conclusion: the credit 
channel of MPT is rather weak, a conclusion that can directly stem from the architecture of 
the financial and banking sectors in the three CEECs (see also Anzuini and Levy, 2004, on 
this topic).  
As stated earlier, the introduction of control European variables enhances the accuracy of 
the estimations. Hericourt and Matei (2004) also introduce exogenous variables in their VAR 
specification, with different groups of exogenous variables depending upon different groups 
of countries, but they do not discuss the situation without those exogenous variables. 
Moreover, their model does not include exchange rates and money (or credit) variables, so 
that their results are not comparable with ours.  
Major results ensuing from our different specifications are threefold. First, the price 
puzzle is in fact an “exchange-rate puzzle” that has to do with the credibility of the entire 
policy mix. Only in Hungary with the introduction of a money (or credit) aggregate is the 
price hike following an unexpected tight monetary policy solved, but the “exchange-rate 
puzzle” remains. Second, in Poland, the exchange rate and the interest rate channels play a 
growing role in the recent period as monetary policy transmission mechanisms, in comparison 
with the same channels in the Czech Republic and Hungary. Last, over the whole transition 
period, from 1993 onwards, industrial production responses to supply, monetary or financial 
shocks have been astonishingly low. Unless the focus is on the most recent period (Hericourt 
and Matei, 2004, found a similar outcome), one has to acknowledge an “industrial-production 
puzzle” within the VAR-type methodology. The low sensitivity of industrial production to a 
monetary policy shock is also noticeable in Anzuini and Levy (2004)24 and Jarocinski (2004). 
An important question could thus be: what drove industrial production in the early stages of 
transition? 
 
 
                                                 
23 Notably Anzuini and Levy (2004), Borhijs and Kuijs (2004), Creel and Levasseur (2004), EFN (2004), 
Ganev et al. (2002), Gunduz (2003), Hericourt and Matei (2004), Jarocinski (2004), and Kuijs (2002). 
24 Using the same recursive identification scheme as Anzuini and Levy (2004) (they also perform non-
recursive-Kim (1999)-type identification schemes), on the same sample with the same number of lags, but with 
our own dataset and the nominal effective exchange rate replacing their commodity price index, we have been 
unable to replicate their IRFs for Hungary and Poland.  
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Appendix 1. Descriptive data on financial sectors 
 
Table A: Bank credit to private sector  
(annual real growth rates, by economic sector, 1998-2002) 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Cumulative
1998-2002
Czech republic
Private sector -5,1 -4,8 -5,4 -6,1 -0,3 -21,7
Enterprises -4,6 -5,3 -6,9 -7,8 -3,2 -27,8
Households -9,5 -0,8 6,7 6,5 17,2 20,1
Estonia
Private sector 30,5 4,6 10,4 20,4 22,0 87,9
Enterprises 28,9 3,6 8,6 19,5 18,9 79,5
Households 39,0 8,6 18,9 23,9 34,0 124,4
Hungary
Private sector 10,1 7,2 17,4 16,5 7,6 58,8
Enterprises 12,8 6,4 14,7 12,1 -0,9 45,1
Households -6,0 13,1 36,7 43,3 45,9 133,0
Latvia
Private sector 54,5 26,6 17,4 30,8 34,5 163,8
Enterprises 53,2 23,2 12,1 25,8 26,9 141,2
Households 65,6 52,5 50,6 55,3 61,7 285,7
Lithuania
Private sector 4,5 12,7 -4,7 26,1 29,6 68,2
Enterprises 37,7 10,6 -3,0 26,2 23,7 95,2
Households 37,1 27,0 -14,6 24,9 69,6 144,0
Poland
Private sector 15,6 17,8 12,9 7,4 4,1 57,8
Enterprises 14,8 16,9 9,4 3,7 0,6 45,4
Households 21,1 22,9 23,3 15,3 9,7 92,3
Slovakia
Private sector -1,2 -1,2 -3,8 -14,0 -12,3 -32,5
Enterprises -2,2 -2,9 -5,8 -17,2 -16,0 -44,1
Households 16,0 24,6 20,8 14,1 13,8 89,3
Slovenia
Private sector 12,0 19,0 15,1 7,7 5,6 59,4
Enterprises 12,0 15,7 12,6 11,1 8,3 59,7
Households 12,1 26,6 20,9 0,5 -0,5 59,6  
  Source: Cottarelli et al. (2003). 
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Table B: Financing the growth of bank credit to private sector  
(annual average changes in the ratio between balance sheet items and GDP,  
in percentage points of GDP) 
 Reference 
period 
Bank 
loans to 
private 
sector 
Bank 
credit to 
the 
public 
sector 
Bank 
deposits 
Net 
foreign 
liabilities 
Other net 
liabilities 
New EU members CEECs  
Czech Republic 
Estonia 
Hungary 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Poland 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
 
 
1998-2002 
1992-2002 
1997-2002 
1998-2002 
2002 
1998-2002 
1998-2002 
1995-2002 
 
-3.0 
3.2 
1.5 
3.3 
2.6 
1.8 
-4.0 
2.3 
 
 
1.7 
-0.0 
-0.3 
0.0 
0.6 
-0.2 
2.0 
-0.1 
 
-0.3 
1.7 
0.4 
2.2 
2.3 
1.9 
0.3 
2.2 
 
 
3.8 
0.9 
-0.7 
2.1 
1.2 
0.5 
1.0 
0.5 
 
-4.8 
0.6 
1.5 
-1.0 
-0.2 
-1.0 
-3.3 
-0.3 
 Source: Cottarelli et al., (2003). 
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Appendix 2. Data (sources and description) 
 
European exogenous variables 
 
euro
tp  is the harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP) for the 15 "old" members of EU. 
euro
ty  is the industrial production index for the 15 "old" members of EU, plus 3 members 
of EFTA (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway). 
euro
ti  is the policy interest rate of the Bundesbank from 1993:1 to 1998:12, then of the 
ECB from 1999:1 to 2004:3 (rate on the main refinancing operations). 
Data for eurotp and 
euro
ty  were taken from Eurostat while data for 
euro
ti were taken from IMF. 
 
Endogenous variables for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland 
 
tp , ty , ti and te  denote respectively the consumer prices index, the industrial 
production, the policy interest rate and the nominal effective exchange rate for the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland. 
tm  and tdc denote respectively a broad monetary aggregate (M2) and the domestic credit 
aggregate for the same three countries. 
All endogenous data were taken from IMF. 
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Appendix 3. Results of the VAR 
Figure 1 
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N.B.: shock 1: innovation on industrial production 
      shock 2: innovation on the consumer price index 
      shock 3: innovation on the nominal interest rate 
      shock 4: innovation on the nominal effective exchange rate 
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Figure 1/bis 
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Figure 1/ter 
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Figure 2 
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N.B.: shock 1: innovation on industrial production 
      shock 2: innovation on the consumer price index 
      shock 3: innovation on the nominal interest rate 
      shock 4: innovation on the nominal effective exchange rate 
      shock 5: innovation on the money aggregate 
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Figure 2/bis 
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Figure 2/ter 
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Figure 3 
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N.B.: shock 1: innovation on industrial production 
      shock 2: innovation on the consumer price index 
      shock 3: innovation on the nominal interest rate 
      shock 4: innovation on the nominal effective exchange rate 
      shock 5: innovation on the credit aggregate 
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Figure 3/bis 
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Figure 3/ter 
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Full sample 1993:1 2004:03
Decomposition S.E. Shock IP Shock CPI Shock IR Shock NEER
Industrial production 0,0336 71,8 21,6 6,4 0,2
Consumer prices 0,0156 0,9 43,0 38,5 17,6
Interest rate 1,6153 2,1 4,0 83,3 10,7
NEER 0,0323 7,8 0,9 5,0 86,3
Decomposition S.E. Shock IP Shock CPI Shock IR Shock NEER
Industrial production 0,0188 94,6 1,2 0,2 4,0
Consumer prices 0,0231 0,9 83,3 15,6 0,1
Interest rate 1,3519 0,3 16,7 81,9 1,1
NEER 0,0313 5,1 11,4 11,1 72,4
Decomposition S.E. Shock IP Shock CPI Shock IR Shock NEER
Industrial production 0,0633 96,1 0,9 1,3 1,7
Consumer prices 0,0224 1,0 81,3 4,9 12,8
Interest rate 1,5157 11,0 0,3 73,5 15,1
NEER 0,0376 0,4 0,3 4,3 95,0
Short sample 1999:12 2004:03
Decomposition S.E. Shock IP Shock CPI Shock IR Shock NEER
Industrial production 0,0197 96,4 0,7 0,6 2,3
Consumer prices 0,0083 12,6 73,5 10,2 3,6
Interest rate 0,3174 2,7 14,5 38,1 44,7
NEER 0,0235 7,8 2,6 4,7 85,0
Decomposition S.E. Shock IP Shock CPI Shock IR Shock NEER
Industrial production 0,0232 73,7 7,5 2,6 16,3
Consumer prices 0,0125 0,0 99,3 0,0 0,6
Interest rate 1,6271 8,3 5,4 74,2 12,2
NEER 0,0239 9,1 3,7 16,0 71,3
Decomposition S.E. Shock IP Shock CPI Shock IR Shock NEER
Industrial production 0,0365 50,5 12,6 12,7 24,2
Consumer prices 0,0068 2,3 59,6 26,8 11,3
Interest rate 1,2111 11,4 9,7 66,0 12,9
NEER 0,0401 2,3 12,3 4,6 80,8
IP: Industrial production.
CPI: Consumer price index.
IR: Interest rate.
NEER: Nominal effective exchange rate.
Hungary
Poland
Table 2: Variance decomposition
Czech republic
Hungary
Poland
Czech republic
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
